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Abstract 
This study is concerned with the components of the total 
seigniorage revenues that have been collected by the Turkish 
governments during the years 1970-1997. 
Traditionally, a government can increase the monetary base in 
order to finance its expenditures partially. This form of monetary 
finance is related to active seigniorage revenues. On the other hand, as 
real economic growth takes place, a government can also benefit from 
this process as a result of an increase in demand for the real money 
balances which is termed as passive seignoirage revenues. 
This paper presents empirically that Turkish governments have 
benefited from both types of seignoirage revenues in order to finance its 
budget deficits during the years 1970-1997 but this policy seems to lose 
its effectiveness in the recent years due to the financial liberalization.  
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
In the monetary economics, the ability of a government to finance 
its outlays (expenditure and lending) by issuing paper money is called  
inflationary finance or seigniorage. In other words, seigniorage 
represents the amount of resources that a government gains by 
exercising its right of monopoly in issuing fiat money. The monetary 
economics literature on the concept and measurement of seigniorage has 
been growing rapidly especially since the 1970s. Except for  few 
studies, the existing literature seem to havee been concentrated mainly 
on the total seigniorage revenues and its optimality. Even though 
several studies have distinguished the different components of 
seigniorage, only a few of these studies have attempted to measure the 
extents of these components of seigniorage empirically.  
  However, as far as this study is concerned the components of 
seigniorage as described by Fischer (1982), i.e. active and passive 
seigniorage, have not been measured empirically yet. Thus, this study 
aims at measuring the extent of these components of seigniorage in the 
case of Turkey. 
  Thus, this paper is formed as follows: Section II presents some 
basic definitional issues on seigniorage. Section III briefly introduces 
the measurement method that is being used in measuring active and 
passive seigniorage. Section IV presents the estimation results and 
compare them to the previous empirical studies relating to Turkey. The 
last section draws some conclusions. 
II.BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SEIGNIORAGE 
 
  In the monetary economics literature, the concept of seigniorage, 
in general, is being used along side the concept of tax. For example, 
Friedman (1971) sees the issue of fiat money as a tax on cash balances 
since the government has the right of the sole issuer of money and all 
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money is non-interest bearing (Friedman, 1971, 846). Governments that 
issue fiat money might find inflation an efficient method to finance 
government expenditures as put by Ertugrul (1979) (Ertugrul, 1979, 86). 
This form of inflationary finance or seigniorage is a time-honoured 
source of government that was originally accrued to medical money-
issuing lords in amounts equalling the difference between the face value 
of money and its minting costs (Cody, 1991, 73). 
  There might be some more justifications for the right of 
seigniorage as indicated by Cukierman et al. (1992) which argue that 
seigniorage reflects high costs of administering and enforcing the 
collection of regular taxes (Cukierman, et al., 1992, 537). Seigniorage 
is a relatively inexpensive source of government revenue if there is 
especially widespread tax evasion or if there are large collection costs. 
Seigniorage also reflects the inability to reach any policy decision 
rather than being due to costs of enforcing and administering tax 
collections. Fischer (1982) argues that the right to print paper money is 
peculiarly important in providing government with a ready source of 
finance in an emergency such as at war-times (Fischer, 1982, 297). 
Nevertheless, seigniorage may have the same distorting welfare effect 
as inflation, as the increases in monetary base may lead to increases in 
prices by causing decreases in the purchasing power of money. Several 
considerations have been given to this issue, especially regarding the 
social cost of taxation in the form of seigniorage (see Marty (1967), 
(1973) and (1976), Barro (1972) and Mankiw (1987). 
  The modern monetary economics literature on seigniorage 
presents basically three important factors in determining the level of 
seigniorage revenues in a steady-state situation. The first factor is 
related to an increase in the level of monetary base and inflation level. 
The second factor is related to an increase in the level of real income. 
And the last factor is related to the rate of required reserves for the 
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commercial banks (Bilgili, 1997, 97). Therefore we write a simple 
seigniorage function with the corresponding signs as follows: 
sf H g r r ==
++ +
(( ), , ) π  
where s is seigniorage revenues, H is the level of monetary base, π is 
inflation rate, g is real income growth rate and rr is required reserves 
rates for the commercial banks. 
  Assuming that economy is in a steady-state, an increase in the 
level of monetary base (or inflation) will give rise to a disequilibrium at 
money and goods markets. As a result of this initial increase in 
monetary base, the public's real cash holdings will start to fall, unless 
there is a corresponding real income increase to compensate for the 
adverse effect of the initial increase in monetary base. Thus, the initial 
increase in the monetary base (or inflation) will have the same impact 
as a tax on the purchasing power of money. Having mentioned this 
point, it is assumed that governments are able to influence the level of 
monetary base and able to use it as a tax base. The implicit assumption 
made here is that central banks do not have independence. The classical 
monetary economists are mainly concentrated on this component of 
seigniorage as a result of their explicit assumption that governments can 
actively pursue a policy of increasing the monetary base in order to 
finance their expenditures: see Marty (1967), Friedman (1971) and 
Auernheimer (1974). As far as the passive seigniorage is concerned, it 
is assumed that an increase in real income gives rise to an increase in 
demand for real cash balances even if the inflation does not exist. Thus, 
this form of seigniorage takes place without the government's active 
involvement. This form of seigniorage was implicity distinguished for 
the first time by Friendman (1971) and Marty (1973) and was explicitly 
put forward by Fischer (1982). 
  The last component of seigniorage is derived from the deposit and 
capital requirements of commercial banks that are held by the central 
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banks and which bears no interest or interest lower than market rates. 
Assuming that the level of the required reserve rates are set by the 
central banks, governments may also use this financal instrument as part 
of tax base as indicated by Rovelli (1994) (Rovelli, 1994, 30). On the 
other hand, Seigel (1981) argues that this form of seigniorage will be 
higher if the banking system is competitive rather than monopolized, 
since deposit rates are lower under the monopoly banking system 
(Siegel, 1981, 355). Nevertheless, except Rovelli (1994), all the 
empirical studies on the level of seigniorage revenues uses the variable 
of monetary base in their calculations which is inclusive of the reserve 
requirements. This procedure is also adopted in this study. Therefore we 
face only two types of seigniorage, as defined by Fischer (1982). The 
first one is derived from an increase in the level of monetary base which 
government may actively pursue this policy in order to finance its 
expenditures. This form of seigniorage is called active seigniorage. The 
second type of seigniorage is derived from an increase in the level of 
real income which also increases demand for real cash balances. This 
form of seigniorage is not influenced by the government's policy 
directly and is called passive seigniorage (Fischer, 1982, 300-301). 
III.MEASUREMENT METHOD 
 
The traditional Cambridge money demand equation can be used to 
derive a measure of seigniorage. Thus, in this equation, the demand for 
money holdings as: 
M = k P Y          ( 1 )  
or 
M / P = k Y        ( 1 a )  
where M is the level of the monetary stock or monetary base, P is the 
price level, Y is the level of nominal income and k is the money 
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holdings' multiplier. Similarly if we write the Fischer type quantity 
equation as follows:  
M V = P Y        ( 2 )  
where V is the velocity of money.  
If we take the logarithmic differentation of equation (1a) with respect to 
time and performing some manipulation on it, we can show that total (s) 
seigniorage revenues equal: 






  According to equation (3), sources of seigniorage revenues are 
determined by the real economic growth (g) and by the inflation rate 
(π). The equation (3) also implies that economic expansion allows the 
government to earn seigniorage at a constant inflation rate, which is 
termed by Fisher (1982) as passive seigniorage. On the other hand, a 
rising price level reduces the real value of money balances and 
governments can accommodate the public's increased nominal money 
demand by printing more money. This form of finance is defined as 
active seigniorage. 
  In the equation (3), gk represents the passive seigniorage rate and 
πk represents active seigniorage rate.Thus, the components of the total 
seigniorage revenues in a more explicit forms are as follows: 
 p s = g k Y        ( 3 a )  
 as=πk Y        ( 3 b )  
where ps is the passive seigniorage revenues and as is the active 
seigniorage revenues. 
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IV.RESULTS AND EVALUATIONS 
 
  Active, passive and total seigniorage revenues are estimated by 
using equations (3), (3a) and (3b) for the period of 1970-1997 and 
presented in Appendix 2. To draw some evaluations on the extent of 
active, passive and total seigniorage revenues Table 1 and Table 2 are 
prepared. 
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Table 1: Active and Passive Seigniorage  
As % of National and Public Income: 1970-1999 
Years  ASRY  PSRY  SY  ASRTPR PSRTPR SRTPR           g      π  BDY
1970 1.01  0.47  1.49  6.01 2.87 8.89 4.4  9.5  0.14
1971 1.97  0.81  2.78 11.25 4.96 16.22 7.0  17.0  -2.14
1972  1.98  1.18  3.17  10.92 6.78 17.70 9.2 15.5 0.00
1973 2.55  0.59  3.15 14.25 3.73 17.98 4.9  21.0  -0.70
1974 2.92  0.37  3.29 17.62 2.64 20.27 3.3  26.0  -0.78
1975 1.33  0.71  2.05  7.56 4.19 11.76 6.1  11.4  -0.20
1976 2.04  1.06  3.10 10.52 5.76 16.29 9.0  17.3  -0.49
1977 3.89  0.41  4.30 18.04 2.26 20.31 3.0  28.5  -3.98
1978 7.03  0.15  7.19 26.35 0.79 27.14 1.2  53.6  -1.46
1979 8.43  -0.05  8.38 30.81 -0.29 30.51 -0.5  75.1  -2.30
1980 8.61  -0.26  8.34 32.64 -1.52 31.12 -2.8  90.3  -2.99
1981 3.34  0.47  3.81 15.67 2.55 18.22 4.8  34.1  -1.19
1982 3.13  0.35  3.48 18.00 2.40 20.41 3.1  27.6  -1.30
1983 3.07  0.45  3.53 14.57 2.48 17.05 4.2  28.1  -1.94
1984 4.61  0.70  5.32 25.07 4.86 29.93 7.1  46.4  -5.03
1985 3.53  0.36  3.90 17.90 2.19 20.10 4.3  41.7  -0.09
1986 2.16  0.53  2.70 14.34 3.97 18.31 6.8  27.5  -2.37
1987 3.13  0.78  3.92 19.22 5.60 24.83 9.8  39.3  -3.86
1988 5.34  0.13  5.47 29.09 1.00 30.10 1.5  60.8  -3.58
1989 4.74  0.11  4.86 25.84 0.85 26.69 1.6  65.0  -3.25
1990 2.90  0.52  3.42 16.88 3.52 20.41 9.4  52.3  -2.93
1991 3.42  0.18  3.61 17.99 1.17 19.17 3.0  55.3  -4.91
1992 4.43  0.45  4.89 21.93 2.81 24.74 6.4  62.1  -4.2
1993 3.42  0.47  3.89 16.28 2.62 18.90 8.1  58.4  -6.70
1994 5.88  -0.29  5.58 23.29 -1.55 21.73 -6.1  120.7  -3.75
1995 4.37  0.39  4.76 19.65 2.16 21.82 8.0  88.5  -4.03
1996 3.11  0.30  3.41 14.63 1.64 16.27 7.4  75.9  -8.08
1997 3.77  0.33  4.10 15.76 1.61 17.37 8.1  92.5  -7.52
   1998           
1999          
 
 
Note: see Appendix 1 for data definitions. 
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  When we look at the components of total seigniorage revenues 
during the estimation period, especially active seigniorage revenues 
seem to be fluctating considerably and have the largest share in the total 
seigniorage revenues as expected. As far as the fluctuations in active 
seigniorage revenues are concerned, the fluctations in the inflation rates 
in the 1970s seem to be creating proportionate active seigniorage 
revenues. For example, in the first half of 1970s, the moderate inflation 
rates give rise to moderate active seigniorage revenues. However, as the 
rate of inflation started to increase sharply in the second half of the 
1970s, the share of active seigniorage revenues in the GNP increased 
sharply too. Indeed, in the years of 1979 and 1980, active seigniorage 
revenues reached their peak points which are 8.43 per cent and 8.61per 
cent respectively. In the same years, the inflation rates also reached 
their peak point. Nevertheless, this considerably good proportionate 
relation between active seigniorage and inflation seem to be weakened 
in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, almost the same inflation rate in 
1987 like 1980 has produced a lot less active seigniorage revenues in 
1997. There are several other years after the 1980s that prove the 
above-mentioned points. One of the reasons in explaining the weakening 
relation between inflation rates and active seigniorage revenues could 
be that the years of 1980s and 1990s are very different from the years of 
1970s in terms of financial and economic structure. Indeed, the 1970s 
Turkey  experienced a lots of upheavals, external prices shocks such as 
rampant price increases in crude oil and negative interest rates and 
unrealistic exchange rates; whereas, the 1980s and 1990s Turkey have 
established free market economy principles, financial liberalizations, 
deregulations, and economic integrations. Consequently real interest 
rates, realistic exchange rates and financial liberalization have all 
resulted in a large scale of financial substitution especially in the form 
of currency, which has started to limit the scope of active seigniorage 
revenues. As indicated by Nichols (1973), the existence of flexible 
exchange rates brings about an avoidance of domestic currency unless it 
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is absolutely necessary (Nichols, 1973, 424). On the other hand, Fischer 
(1982) argues that even for a country that fixes its exchange rates, it 
still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own currency (Fischer, 1982, 
295). 
  As we look at the contribution of active seigniorage revenues to 
government deficits, we see that active seigniorage revenues as 
percentage of public revenues have also reached their peak points in the 
years of 1979 and 1980 which are 30.81 per cent and 32.64 per cent 
respectively. That indicates that active seigniorage revenues were a 
good income resource to shrink the government deficits during these 
periods. Nevertheless, this policy does not have a regular pattern, but 
we may say tentatively that the Turkish governments used active 
seigniorage policy during the general election periods in 1977, 1983, 
1987 and 1991 since active seigniorage revenues as a percentage of total 
public revenues seem to be differ sharply before and after the election 
periods. For example, the share of the active seigniorage in the total 
public revenues in 1976 was 10.52 per cent but it increased to 18.04 per 
cent and it went up further in the subsequent three years by reaching 
32.64 per cent in 1980. The last quarter of the 1970s in the Turkish 
political life was one of the most instable period, which led to several 
coalition governments and byelections and eventually to a military 
regime in 1980. Then in due course, the share of the active seigniorage 
revenues fell to the levels of the mid 1970s until the military regime 
was over in 1983. The resumed democratic life after 1983 and 
subsequent general elections gave rise to sharp increases in the rate of 
active seigniorage rates.However, the large scale capital account 
liberalization in 1988 did seem to have an adverse effect on this policy. 
Another tentative reason for the decrease in active seigniorage revenues 
as a percentage of public revenues in the 1990s is that the Turkish 
central bank appears to be a little more independent in its operations. 
As indicated by Cukierman, et al.(1992), the higher the independence of 
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the central bank, the lower is inflation and therefore seigniorage 
(Cukierman, et al. 1992, 554). 
  As far as passive seigniorage revenues are concerned, the pattern 
is as expected, i.e. its positive as the real growth rate is positive or vice 
versa. Nevertheless, its contribution and absolute magnitude also 
presents a fluctuating pattern which is more or less following the 
pattern of active seigniorage revenues. The absolute share of passive 
seigniorage in GNP reached its climax in the year of 1972 which is 
estimated to be 1.18 per cent. In the same year in question, the real 
growth rate was 9.2 per cent which is the third highest rate after 1987 
and 1990. As in the case of active seigniorage and inflation rates, the 
relation between passive seigniorage and real growth rates seem to be 
getting weaker in the 1980s and 1990s. Probably, the same tentative 
reasons that have been made for active seigniorage almost hold the same 
for total seigniorage as well. Total seigniorage revenues are evaluated 
via Table 2. The table 2 presents the results of previous studies on total 
seigniorage revenues relating to Turkey. As we look at Table 2, we see 
that over the years, the share of seigniorage revenues in GNP appear to 
be estimated consistently. As the table 2 reveals, the previous studies on 
seigniorage in Turkey produce quite similar results. Nevertheless, the 
total seigniorage revenues on average seem to be significantly larger in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s compared to the 1960s. These results 
indicate that due to political instability in the last three decades, the 
Turkish governments prefer still prefer to adopt the inflationary 
monetary policies to finance ever increasing budget deficits even though 
this policy is not as efficient as it used to be in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
For example, the table 1 indicates that the total seigniorage revenues in 
the 1970s and 1980s were more than sufficient to cover the budget 
deficits. This policy seem to have lost its effectiveness for the 1990s 
due to the financial liberalazition in the late 1980s and in the1990s. 
Consequently the seigniorage revenues are far from covering the budget 
deficits especially in the last quarter of the 1990s.   
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Table 2: Total Seigniorage Revenue Estimates in Turkey: A 
Comparison  
(% of GNP) 
Periods 
Author 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89  1990-97
Ertuğrul (1979:89)  n.a.  4.42
1 n.a.  n.a. 
Fischer (1982:308)  1.9
2 3.7
3 n.a. n.a. 
Küçüker, et al.(1994:151)  n.a.  n.a.  3.36
4 n.a. 
Akçay(1995:221) n.a.  n.a.  3.57  n.a. 
Bilgili (1997:110)  1.61  3.76  2.81
5 n.a. 
Halıcıoğlu (1998)  n.a.  3.89  4.53  4.20 
1 Average of 1970-1978 
2 Average of 1960-1972 
3 Average of 1973-1978 
4 Average of 1983-1992 
5 Average of 1980-1990 
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V.CONCLUSION 
 
  This paper examined active and passive seigniorage finance in 
Turkey for the period of 1970-1997. According to the empirical results, 
particularly active seigniorage has been a major source of revenue for 
the Turkish governments. Considering the significant financial 
deregulation and liberalization and economic integration processes 
which have taken place in the 1980s and 1990s, active seigniorage still 
has an important share in the total public income even though it is 
decreasing. Nevertheless, this form of financing gives rise to the 
concerns for the welfare distributions which have not yet been solved 
fully as indicated by Spaventa (1986) (Spaventa, 1986, 557). Moreover, 
as Bruno and Fischer (1990) have put forward, there may be both a high 
and a low inflation equilibrium when the government finances through 
seigniorage (Bruno and Fischer, 1990, 353). As far as this study is 
concerned, however, the results of this study need to be evaluated with 
caution since this study is primarily concerned with discomposing of 
components of seigniorage in Turkey for the estimation period. The 
results reveal that active seigniorage constitutes an undisputedly high 
share in total seigniorage. However, one cannot rule out the significant 
contribution of passive seigniorage to total public revenues either. 
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APPENDIX 1 
DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 
 
ASR  :  Nominal active seigniorage revenues, (billion TL). 
ASRY  : Nominal active seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal GNP. 
ASRTPR  : Nominal active seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal public revenues which is also inclusive of 
nominal active seigniorage revenues. 
BDY  : Consolidated budget deficits as percentage of nominal 
GNP. 
BDEFICIT  :  Nominal consolidated budget deficits, (billion TL). 
Source: SSI. 
GEXPENSE  :  Nominal consolidated public expenditures, (billion TL). 
Source: SSI. 
GINCOME  :  Nominal consolidated public incomes, (billion TL). 
Source: SSI. 
GNP  :   Nominal gross domestic product, (billion TL). 
Source: SSI. 





Real national product growth rate, at producer's prices 
of 1987. 
Source: SSI. 
H  :  Nominal monetary base (or high powered money), 
(billion TL) For a detailed explanation see Keyder
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π  :  Annual percentage changes in consumer prices index. 
Source: SSI. 
k  :  Money multiplier, k=1/V. 
PSR  :  Nominal passive seigniorage revenues, (billion TL). 
PSRY  : Passive nominal seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal GNP. 
PSRTPR  : Nominal passive seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal public revenues which is also inclusive of 
nominal passive seigniorage. 
S  :  Nominal total seigniorage revenues, (billion TL). 
SY  : Nominal total seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal GNP. 
SRTPR  : Nominal total seigniorage revenues as percentage of 
nominal public revenues which is also inclusive of 
nominal total seigniorage revenues. 
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